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DRILLING FOR DAMAGES:




OING business in America is becoming more and more of a chal-
lenge. Congress and the various state legislatures continue to gener-
ate volumes of laws, which are then detailed and implemented by
the numerous federal and state agencies through more volumes of regula-
tions. The oil and gas industry certainly has not escaped the strong arm of
government. Industry operations have been significantly impacted by fed-
eral and state statutes and regulations and are likely to be only more so in
the foreseeable future. The sobering potential for fines and penalties under
the various federal and state regulatory schemes has created great financial
exposure for oil exploration and production companies. In addition to this
real intimidation by regulation, the oil and gas industry is also having to
defend itself against a second offensive from the environmental movement,
which could prove to be just as costly.
A trend has been developing in certain oil and gas producing states that
should give concern to companies with past or present operations in those
states. This additional challenge has provided the perfect context in which
to allege natural resource damage from current or historical oilfield opera-
tions and obtain significant settlements and judgments.
Hundreds of oilfields throughout Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, New Mex-
ico, California, Kansas, and Colorado have operated for decades. Older
fields sometimes show their age in the form of older equipment, abandoned
tanks and lines, and little or no vegetation in the immediate areas of opera-
tion. Older fields also often mean that the mineral owners have long since
died or moved away, and that the current owners or occupants of the surface
have no financial interest in the production. Consequently, the surface
owner is often in a state of perpetual irritation at the presence of oilfield
equipment on his or her property that reduces the amount of acreage avail-
able to the owner for farming, grazing cattle, or other uses that are more
desirable. Even where the surface owner is also a royalty owner, the owner's
* William R. Keffer is a 1984 graduate of the University of Texas School of Law, who,
after having spent the past six years as a senior environmental attorney with ARCO Oil and
Gas Company in Dallas, has recently joined the Dallas law firm of Gardere & Wynne and
practices in their environmental litigation section.
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share of the royalties typically is nominal, and declining production means
the share will only get smaller. This absence of a financial stake in continu-
ing production, coupled with a likely irritation over the oil company's inter-
ference in the surface owner's activities, essentially creates a volatile
environment from which litigation almost inexorably is born.
The plaintiffs' bar is slowly discovering that bringing private pollution ac-
tions, using traditional common law theories, against oil companies on be-
half of landowners is a more efficient, and often more lucrative, way to
pursue these claims than by trying to avail themselves of citizen suit provi-
sions or other forms of relief contained in the various federal and state envi-
ronmental laws. There is a somewhat unholy alliance between the ever-
increasing number of statutes and regulations and the familiar common law
causes of action. Each new statutory or regulatory requirement sets a new
standard against which a defendant oil company's operations can be mea-
sured. The arguable scientific basis for any new law becomes irrelevant, and
the defendant, to a large extent, becomes the helpless victim of a plaintiff
that has bootstrapped a regulation into a private cause of action for
negligence.
There are also other common law causes of action that are used by plain-
tiffs pursuing property damage and personal injury claims resulting from
alleged pollution caused by oilfield operations. These traditional theories are
being dusted off and retooled for new and improved application in these
times of strident environmentalism.
The media have also noticed these developments and have reported that
oilfield pollution is yet one more example of how American industry is
poisoning our nation's land and its people. Without much effort, the average
man on the street is conditioned to believe that oilfield operations are evil
and should be abolished from the land, without much consideration for the
countless benefits generated by the oil and gas industry. As a result, you
often read statements like: "Huge patches of West Texas have become
oilfield deserts, because for years the saltwater that is a result of oil produc-
tion was released to flow across the land, leaving it bare." 1 Statements like
this are quite an exercise in hyperbole and would lead one to believe that
West Texas, without oilfields, would otherwise be a lush and verdant land.
Also heard are statements like: "For years, toxic waste from oil fields has
been spilling onto ranches and farmland and into rivers and coastal bays,
contaminating both rural and urban drinking water."' 2 The average listener
inescapably envisions a tidal wave of black poison covering the countryside.
Planting these thoughts in the minds of the general population, from whom
juries will be chosen, makes environmental litigation a rather ominous pros-
pect for oil companies.
One particular kind of case that has been in vogue since the mid-1980s is
alleged groundwater contamination by chlorides (i.e., salt) resulting from
1. Robert Bryce, More Precious Than Oil, TEX. MONTHLY, Feb. 1991, at 108.
2. Morning Edition: Oil Waste Disposal a Problem in Southwest (National Public Radio
broadcast, Apr. 13, 1992).
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contamination of the freshwater zone with produced water associated with
the production of oil and gas. Groundwater, as a natural resource, is highly
valued, especially in arid climates like the Permian Basin, where oil and gas
operations are pervasive. As a result, suits can become highly volatile be-
cause of the scarcity of freshwater. Cattle ranchers have vigorously prose-
cuted these claims, proclaiming that freshwater is more precious than oil. 3
As one article described the trend, "[h]aving polluted water, a good lawyer,
and a pending lawsuit against a major oil company has become a tradition in
West Texas. ' '4
II. THEORIES AND PRACTICE
A. THEORIES OF RECOVERY
Suits are being filed and cases are being tried. These are the theories that
are being used.
1. Nuisance
By far, this cause of action tends to be the most popular in groundwater
contamination cases simply because the plaintiff need not prove the defend-
ant's negligence to recover damages.5 Instead, the plaintiff need only estab-
lish that the defendant has unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff's
enjoyment of his or her property:6 "A nuisance does not rest on the degree
of care used, but on the degree of danger or annoyance existing even with the
best of care."' 7 In Texas, it is clear that a private nuisance claim can support
an allegation of property damage and personal injury caused by pollution. 8
Oilfield operations themselves, however, do not constitute a nuisance.
There must be a material or substantial injury to a person of ordinary health
and sensibilities in that particular locale.9 Characterizing an oilfield opera-
tion as a nuisance typically results from the manner in which the activity is
conducted.
The nuisance theory has been likewise pursued in other jurisdictions, such
as Colorado, 10 Kansas," and Oklahoma.' 2 In Oklahoma, for example, the
theory has been defined by statute. 13 Traditionally, the determination of
nuisance turned in large part on whether the activity complained of was
common to the area, as in the case of oil and gas exploration and production
3. Bryce, supra note 1, at 108.
4. Id.
5. Manchester Terminal Corp. v. Texas TxTx Marine Transp., Inc., 781 S.W.2d 646, 651
(Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 651.
8. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Smith, 290 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1956,
no writ).
9. Vestal v. Gulf Oil Corp., 149 Tex. 487, 235 S.W.2d 440 (1951).
10. Miller v. Carnation Co., 516 P.2d 661 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973).
11. Miller v. Cudahy Co., 858 F.2d 1449 (10th Cir. 1988).
12. Briscoe v. Harper Oil Co., 702 P.2d 33 (Okla. 1985).
13. OKLA. STAT. tit. 50, § 1 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
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in a producing state like Texas. The more common the activity, the less
likely it would be considered a nuisance.14 As the environmental movement
grows and toleration of the oil and gas industry wanes, however, it is likely
that yesterday's economic accommodation will become tomorrow's
nuisance.
In addition to a claim of private nuisance, plaintiffs sometimes assert a
claim of public nuisance. Plaintiffs usually find it difficult to sustain a claim
of public nuisance because the act complained of must be shown to interfere
with the right of the community at large.' 5 Where the plaintiff is able to
sustain such a cause of action, however, he or she is able to avoid the poten-
tially significant impact of the statute of limitations. ' 6 Typically, public pol-
icy prohibits the applicability of the statute of limitations to a public
nuisance. ' 7
The traditional remedy is the cost of abatement or abatement of the nui-
sance itself.' 8 Generally, plaintiffs in these cases are not as interested in see-
ing the nuisance abated as they are in recovering damages based on the
estimated cost of abatement. The traditional measure of damages in prop-
erty damage cases is the diminution in value of the property caused by the
nuisance. ' 9 Currently, however, abatement costs usually far exceed the di-
minished value and, indeed, the total value of the property prior to injury.
Although the traditional rule limits recovery to the diminished value, plain-
tiffs are arguing for removal of, and courts are finding ways to circumvent,
such a cap. 20 Cases are being settled for sums of money that would indicate
that the potentially greater financial exposure associated with abatement that
exceeds the value of the property is a principal consideration for defendants.
Nuisance claims also permit recovery of punitive damages, 2 1 which may
be limited in different ways from state to state. In Texas, a statute limits
recovery to four times the actual damages or $200,000, whichever is greater,
unless the plaintiff proves malice or an intentional tort, in which case no cap
applies. 22 In Oklahoma, a punitive damage award may not exceed the
amount of the actual damage award, unless the court finds clear and con-
vincing evidence of wanton or reckless conduct, fraud, or malice on the part
14. Humble Pipe Line Co. v. Anderson, 339 S.W.2d 259, 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
15. Ballenger v. City of Grand Saline, 276 S.W.2d 874, 875 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1928,
writ refd).
16. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 50, § 1 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
17. See id. § 7; City of Corsicana v. King, 3 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1928,
writ ref'd).
18. But see OKLA. STAT. tit. 50, § 6 (1988 & Supp. 1994) (specifically providing that, in
Oklahoma, abatement will not preclude recovery of damages caused by the nuisance).
19. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Anderson, 514 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1974), af'd, 524 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1975).
20. See Cudahy Co., 858 F.2d at 1456-57 (holding that plaintiffs could recover punitive
damages and temporary damages in excess of the diminished permanent value of the land).
21. Bily v. Omni Equities, Inc., 731 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
22. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.007-.008 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1993).
[Vol. 47
OILFIELD POLLUTION
of the defendant, in which case there is no cap.23 In Colorado, a punitive
damage award may not exceed the amount of the actual damage award, un-
less the act or conduct complained of is continuing, in which case the puni-
tive damage award may be increased up to three times the amount of the
actual damages.24 Nuisance claims also permit recovery of "soft" actual
damages, such as inconvenience, annoyance, and discomfort, which, after
all, constitute the very nature of a nuisance claim.
2. Negligence
As in any other negligence case, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
owed the plaintiff a duty, the defendant breached that duty, that the plaintiff
was injured, and that the plaintiff's injury was proximately caused by the
defendant's breach.25 Although the plaintiff need not prove negligence
under a nuisance theory, negligence is typically included in the laundry list
of theories of recovery nonetheless. In this context, the plaintiff generally
claims that the defendant owed a duty to conduct operations so as not to
pollute the plaintiff's property. 26
The standard of care used in determining the presence of negligence in
these cases can be a frustrating moving target. Although plaintiffs may ar-
gue that the appropriate standard of care should be to conduct operations in
a nonpolluting manner, it is clear that some pollution, technically speaking,
is unavoidable in activities associated with the exploration, production,
transportation, and refining of oil and gas. Spills will occur, lines and tanks
will leak, and equipment upsets will happen because human action is in-
volved. The correct standard of care, as a practical matter, must be to con-
duct operations in a manner that does not unnecessarily or inexcusably
pollute the plaintiff's property.
Defendants typically argue that they have breached no duty and that they
have in fact conducted their operations in a manner consistent with the rules
of the state agency that regulates oil and gas operations as well as with the
customary practices of the industry. As so many unwitting defendants have
found out, however, relying on the defense that "you were only doing some-
thing the way it has always been done before" can be as ineffective as trying
to avoid parental discipline by arguing that "all the other kids did it."
Although there is certainly a great deal of objective merit in showing regula-
tory compliance and industry practice, such a showing almost always
smacks of technical obfuscation and insensitivity, not the best impressions to
leave with a jury.
One additional difficulty associated with identifying the appropriate stan-
dard of care is determining at what point in time a defendant's duty should
be measured. In other words, should a defendant's past conduct be analyzed
23. OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9 (1981 & Supp. 1993).
24. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102 (1993). Interestingly, for any award of punitive dam-
ages in Colorado, one-third of it must be paid into the state's general fund. Id.
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1989).
26. Brown v. Lundell, 162 Tex. 84, 344 S.W.2d 863 (1961).
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according to the standards of the past or present? Oilfields tend to be long-
lived operations, and oilfield technology has evolved significantly over the
decades. Plaintiffs typically will attempt to indict the operations of a defend-
ant from the 1950s or before, alleging that these operations led to the pollu-
tion being complained about today by describing how these operations fail to
satisfy today's requirements. The inherent unfairness to the defendant in
such an analysis is clear, and yet the psychological advantage for the plaintiff
is undeniable. As a result, developing the negligence theory can also provide
its share of rewards for the plaintiff.
3. Negligence Per Se
If establishing a standard of care proves to be difficult in an ordinary neg-
ligence case, the theory of negligence per se will likely satisfy the plaintiff's
need. 27 Under this theory, the plaintiff must show that: (1) The defendant
violated a statute, rule, regulation, or ordinance; (2) The violation was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury; and (3) The plaintiff is a member of
the group whose protection the subject law contemplates. 28 Proof of the
defendant's violation shifts the burden to the defendant to demonstrate an
acceptable excuse for having committed the violation. 29 With the explosion
of federal and state regulations pertaining to environmental protection and
oil and gas industry operations generally, more and more ammunition is be-
ing made available to plaintiffs with which they can pursue claims against
defendants under this theory. Negligence per se, then, can provide the defi-
nition to what would otherwise be somewhat amorphous arguments under a
negligence theory. Indeed, although there will usually not be a lack of can-
didates for specifically alleged regulatory violations, most state agencies also
include a universal catch-all regulation that prohibits pollution generally.
This catch-all theory of recovery in fact has been put forward by plaintiffs in
several unreported cases. 30 Relying on such broadly worded regulations,
however, presents the same kind of problem with respect to defining the
particular standard of care and, again, is becoming unnecessary with the
proliferation of so many specific regulations. Moreover, despite the exposure
for defendants that results from noncompliance, compliance not only fails to
afford absolute protection, it merely becomes the minimum threshold of ex-
pected conduct.
27. See McAlister v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 662 P.2d 1203 (Kan. 1983) (plaintiff alleged
the defendants had violated KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-121, which prohibited those involved in oil
and gas operations from allowing saltwater to escape from its intended confinement (e.g., well,
tank, pipeline, pond)).
28. El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. 1987).
29. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. American Statesman, 552 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1977).
30. Okla. Corp. Comm'n Rule 3-101 (1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-172 (1992); Tex.
R.R. Comm'n, 16 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.8 (West 1988) (Water Protection). But see Murfee
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.)





Trespass, as a theory of recovery, is routinely included in the laundry list
of claims, but typically is not developed. Trespass has been defined tradi-
tionally as conduct that leads to the invasion of a person's interest in his or
her rightful exclusive possession of property. 3' A trespass may be made in
person or by causing a person or thing to enter another's property.3 2 This
cause of action can afford injunctive relief, as well as recovery of actual and
punitive damages.33
Could an oil and gas lessee who is legally on the surface owner's property
still run the risk of committing a trespass?34 Introducing contaminants, such
as chlorides from produced water, scale containing NORM (naturally occur-
ring radioactive material), or other allegedly hazardous substances resulting
from oil and gas operations onto someone's property might theoretically
constitute a trespass. Trespass, however, always requires a showing of fault
because it is an intentional tort.35 If evidence of fault is lacking, cases have
generally relied on the theory of nuisance; 36 where there is evidence of fault,
negligence has been the preferred theory.37
The typical groundwater contamination case involves not only allegations
of contamination of the freshwater zone by chlorides or other substances
leaching down from the surface (i.e., "top-down" contamination), but it also
involves allegations of contamination resulting from the escape of produced
water or other fluids from the wellbore into the surrounding zone, ultimately
migrating to the freshwater zone (i.e., "lateral" contamination). Lateral
contamination occurs subsurface and introduces an interesting aspect into
the applicability of trespass as a theory of recovery. Historically, Texas
courts have viewed waterfloods favorably as a means to recover more oil,
even though waterflooding a zone necessarily involves introducing a "thing"
under someone's property, more often than not without permission. Stated
practically, Texas has viewed waterflooding as a "permissible" trespass.38 It
is not at all clear, however, that such permission would include protection
against the unintended or unexpected consequences of a waterflood, such as
contamination of a freshwater zone.
5. Strict Liability
Common law strict liability, otherwise known as liability without fault,
31. Pentagon Enters. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 540 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
32. Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 162 Tex. 26, 344 S.W.2d 411 (1961).
33. Southern Pine Lumber Co. v. Smith, 183 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1944, writ refd).
34. Brown v. Lundell, 162 Tex. 84, 344 S.W.2d 863 (1961).
35. General Tel. Co. v. Bi-Co Pavers, Inc., 514 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1974, no writ).
36. Humble Pipe Line Co. v. Anderson, 339 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Civ. App-Waco 1960,
writ refd n.r.e.).
37. Miller v. Cudahy, 858 F.2d 1449 (10th Cir. 1988); Moran Corp. v. Murray, 381
S.W.2d 324, 325 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1964, no writ).
38. Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560, 567-69 (Tex. 1962).
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applies to lawful, as well as unlawful, activities because the level of care
exercised by the defendant is irrelevant. 39 If the activity poses an extraordi-
nary risk and causes an injury to another, it is actionable, even if the defend-
ant did everything he could to prevent the injury.40 This theory has been
used with mixed success, depending on the jurisdiction. In Texas, strict lia-
bility was generally rejected as an available theory of recovery for pollution
cases in Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co.41 The Turner court held that where
property is being put to its "natural" use, strict liability did not apply.42 In
Turner saltwater damage to the surface of the plaintiff's property resulted
from the "natural" use of the property, which apparently included the pro-
duction of oil and gas. A similar injury in an area where oil and gas is not
produced would presumably have had a different result. Turner was reaf-
firmed as good law in Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc. v. Anderson.43 Simi-
larly, Oklahoma has rejected strict liability as a theory of recovery in this
context. 4
Kansas, however, has expressly adopted the doctrine of strict liability in
an effort to regulate pollution. 45 Some unreported district court opinions in
Colorado have also applied strict liability in cases involving environmental
contamination. 46 A Utah case, in which the defendant's adjacent oilfield
operation contaminated the plaintiff's water well, found the defendant's op-
eration to be abnormally dangerous and therefore an appropriate subject for
strict liability.47 An oilfield case from Indiana held that a waterflood opera-
tion was an abnormally dangerous activity. 48
Jurisdictions that heretofore have rejected the applicability of strict liabil-
ity in the context of oilfield operations have done so on the basis that such
operations are not considered to be "ultrahazardous," or "abnormally dan-
gerous," or a "nonnatural" use of the land.49 As environmental considera-
tions increase in frequency and significance, however, the applicability of
those terms to oilfield operations may change.
6. Unjust Enrichment
The essence of the unjust enrichment theory of recovery is that a defend-
ant should not be permitted to enrich himself or herself at the plaintiff's
expense, but instead should be required to make restitution for benefits un-
39. General Tel. Co., 514 S.W.2d at 174.
40. Id.
41. 128 Tex. 155, 166, 96 S.W.2d 221, 226 (1936).
42. Id.
43. 514 S.W.2d 309, 313 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974), affid, 524 S.W.2d 681 (Tex.
1975).
44. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. Stell, 124 P.2d 255, 257 (Okla. 1942).
45. John T. Arnold Assoc., Inc. v. City of Wichita, 615 P.2d 814, 823-26 (Kan. Ct. App.
1980).
46. United States v. Colorado & E. R.R., No. 89-C-1786, 1993 WL 350171, at *2 (D.
Colo., June 9, 1993).
47. Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 274-75 (Utah 1982).
48. Mowrer v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 518 F.2d 659, 662 (7th Cir. 1975).
49. Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 128 Tex. 155, 96 S.W.2d 221, 226 (1936).
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justly received.50 Unjust enrichment has been referred to as a prerequisite
for restitution.5 It is often characterized as a "quasi-contract" or a contract
"implied in law."'52 Unlike an express contract, which is based on the con-
sent of the parties, a quasi-contract is a legal fiction arising not from the
consent of the parties, "but imposed by law to afford a remedy in cases
where a duty devolves upon a party as a matter of law, irrespective of inten-
tion."' 53 In the context of oilfield pollution cases, the plaintiff typically ar-
gues that the defendant has saved money by, and thereby has unjustly
profited from, failing to adequately protect the plaintiff's property from pol-
lution. In other words, at the expense and to the detriment of the plaintiff's
property, the defendant has saved money that should have been spent on
environmental protection. The plaintiff seeks recovery of the so-called "un-
just savings" plus interest from the time the defendant received those bene-
fits or savings. 54
This theory has been articulated, albeit not in much detail, in oilfield pol-
lution cases only in Oklahoma.5 5 This is probably not so much a function of
recognition of this theory in this context in Oklahoma caselaw, as it is the
practice of a particular, prolific plaintiff's attorney, who happens to live in
Oklahoma. It should be noted that this theory introduces the possibility of a
plaintiff discovering financial performance information about a defendant,
when it might otherwise be considered to be outside the scope of discovery.
7. Intentional or Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress/Mental
Anguish
This theory of recovery is usually included in the plaintiff's laundry list of
theories in an attempt to spotlight the emotional aspect of his or her com-
plaint. Invariably, the subject property is the "family farm" that has been
passed down from generation to generation for which intangible, sentimental
value is immeasurable. As a result, any degradation to the property prompts
great trauma and unmitigated anguish, even though, for a sufficient amount,
the distraught plaintiff will gladly trade the "family farm" for a condomin-
ium in Aspen.
Plaintiffs may recover mental anguish damages in Texas even without any
manifestations of a physical injury.5 6 One Tennessee case awarded mental
anguish damages to the plaintiffs because of their distress resulting from the
diminution in value of their property.5 7 Of course, if the plaintiff alleges
personal injury, as a result of ingestion or inhalation of contaminated water




54. Teel v. Public Serv. Co., 767 P.2d 391 (Okla. 1987).
55. Id. at 398-99.
56. Moore v. Lillebo, 722 S.W.2d 683, 686 (Tex. 1986).
57. Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 319 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), afJ'd in
part and rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188, 1212 (6th Cir. 1988).
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or air, the mental anguish will more likely be associated with adverse health
effects or the fear of adverse health effects.
8. Breach of Contract
Compared to the other theories of recovery that are available in this con-
text, breach of contract does not lend itself as easily to recovery of significant
damages, but does provide for the recovery of attorney's fees, which can be
significant. 58 Under this theory, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant
breached his or her covenant not to make excessive or unreasonable use of
the property, which is the same allegation that could form the basis of a
claim for trespass.5 9 Some defendants, refusing to acknowledge the arrival
of the era of environmentalism, continue to maintain that oilfield pollution
cases really constitute nothing more than breach of contract cases all the
way to trial, after which they generally concede their mistake, while seeking
remittitur of a hefty judgment. Punitive damages under this theory are not
available. 6°
B. ASSOCIATED ISSUES
1. Temporary or Permanent Injury
Temporary versus permanent injury is always one of the more significant
issues in oilfield pollution cases. In addition to actually trying to determine
the nature of the injury complained of, there are strategic considerations
associated with choosing whether the injury is temporary, permanent, or
both. The more astute plaintiff's attorney will allege both kinds of injury at
the outset of the case and maintain these seemingly inconsistent charges un-
til discovery more clearly defines the nature of the case; or, in plaintiff's
language, until it becomes clearer which approach is less vulnerable to the
defendant's arguments and, therefore, more sustainable to a jury. It is even
possible in some jurisdictions to assert and recover for both temporary and
permanent injuries. 61
The difference between temporary and permanent injury is significant, pri-
marily as it relates to the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations.
Although claims for permanent injury to property are barred in most juris-
dictions if brought more than two years after discovery of the injury,62
claims for temporary injury to property can be brought for that part of the
injury incurred during the two-year period preceding the filing of the ac-
tion.63 Claims for temporary injury are renewed with each subsequent act of
pollution."r In Texas, permanent injury has been defined as injury that will
58. Gill Sav. Ass'n v. Chair King, Inc., 797 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. 1990).
59. Reimer v. Gulf Oil Corp., 664 S.W.2d 456, 457 (Ark. 1984).
60. Bellefonte Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Brown, 704 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tex. 1986).
61. Briscoe v. Harper Oil Co., 702 P.2d 33, 33 (Okla. 1985). But see Kraft v. Langford,
565 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Tex. 1978) (finding permanent and temporary injury to be mutually
exclusive and thus may not be brought in the same action).
62. See, e.g., Bayouth v. Lion Oil Co., 671 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1984).
63. Kraft, 565 S.W.2d 223.
64. Miller v. Cudahy, 858 F.2d 1449, 1454 (10th Cir. 1988).
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continue indefinitely and be constant; temporary injury has been defined as
injury that is intermittent and dependent upon some event (e.g., rain).65
Courts have recognized that articulating a workable rule for distinguish-
ing between temporary and permanent injury is problematic at best.66 In
fact, one Texas appellate court decision went so far as to try abolishing the
distinction in an effort to prevent defendants from being able to avoid liabil-
ity for permanent injury claims by relying on the statute of limitations. 67 If
an injury is abatable or remediable, it is generally characterized as tempo-
rary.68 As a result, the temporary or permanent nature of any injury is
heavily influenced by the state of remediation technology. What was consid-
ered incapable of remediation yesterday, and consequently permanently in-
jured, may become remediable tomorrow because of developments in
technology, and suddenly be transformed into a temporary injury. It is also
difficult to know when a temporary injury becomes so extensive and so diffi-
cult to remediate that it crosses the threshold and becomes permanent. For
example, in McAlister v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,69 the court noted that, ac-
cording to expert testimony, it would take 150 - 400 years for the ground-
water to cleanse itself of the contamination naturally, so the court
determined that, practically speaking and for legal purposes, the ground-
water had been permanently injured. 70
Whether an injury is temporary or permanent also impacts the measure of
damages for that injury. Traditionally, in most jurisdictions, the measure of
damages for a temporary injury is the cost of repairing the property, plus
compensation for the loss of use of the property.7 1 The measure of damages
for a permanent injury is the diminution in fair market value of the property
caused by the pollution. 72 In neither situation, traditionally, are the dam-
ages supposed to exceed the total fair market value of the property. 73
Although the potential recovery for a temporary injury would generally
seem to be less than the potential recovery for a permanent injury, a practi-
cal problem for a defendant is trying to show what portion of the temporary
injury occurred within the two year statute of limitations and is thus recov-
erable, and what portion occurred more than two years ago and is therefore
barred. From the jury's standpoint, it is always going to be easier to think in
terms of the entire injury having occurred within the most recent two-year
period.
Despite the traditional rule limiting damages to the total fair market value
65. Bayouth, 671 S.W.2d at 868.
66. Miller, 858 F.2d at 1453.
67. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Anderson, 514 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1974), aff'd, 524 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1975).
68. Miller, 858 F.2d at 1453.
69. 662 P.2d 1203 (Kan. 1983).
70. Id. at 1212.
71. Thompson v. Andover Oil Co., 691 P.2d 77, 83 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984); Kraft v. Lang-
ford, 565 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Tex. 1978).
72. Nichols v. Burk Royalty Co., 576 P.2d 317, 321 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977); Kraft, 565
S.W.2d at 227.
73. Thompson, 691 P.2d at 83-84; Anderson, 514 S.W.2d at 319.
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of the property, certain cases indicate that courts are willing to entertain
damage awards based on remediation or restoration costs, even if the costs
exceed the value of the land itself. The Tenth Circuit affirmed a district
court's decision in Kansas to award actual damages for a temporary injury
that exceeded the value of the property.74 Colorado has opened the door to
the possibility of basing a damage award on restoration or remediation costs,
even if they exceed the diminished market value of the property, if the court
finds that such restoration costs would more fairly compensate the plaintiff
for his or her injury.75 A 1993 Colorado district court decision walked
through that door and let stand a jury award of $20,125,000, which repre-
sented restoration costs, even though the diminution in market value was
only $4,159,000.76 In fact, the approved award even exceeded the pre-tort
market value of the property. 77
A recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision also recognized the possibility
of allowing restoration damages to exceed the value of the property. 7 Plain-
tiffs in Texas and Oklahoma continue to request damages based on restora-
tion costs, although no reported case has yet recognized restoration costs as
an acceptable measure of damages. Because remediation is typically very
expensive, and the property in litigation is typically rural farm or ranch land
with a relatively moderate value, the trend will likely continue to favor pro-
tecting the plaintiff and giving him or her the ability to be "made whole"
through remediation instead of limiting damages to the comparatively insig-
nificant diminished value.79
2. Primary Jurisdiction
One defensive strategy invariably discussed and occasionally pursued, is to
seek a stay of the court action and have the matter referred to the appropri-
ate state regulatory agency for handling under the doctrine of primary juris-
diction. A defendant often believes that the nature of the pollution
complaint compels agency action in lieu of, and certainly in advance of, any
kind of private suit, especially where the plaintiff cites violations of various
regulations as part of a negligence per se theory. In other words, the defend-
ant considers the complaint to be one of operational deficiency, in which
case the state agency responsible for regulating his or her operations and
possessing specialized knowledge about the industry should review and han-
dle the complaint.
The benefit sought by the defendant in such a maneuver usually works to
his detriment. Instead of asserting primary jurisdiction, the agency typically
opens its own file and either initiates its own investigation at that time or
waits for the conclusion of the court case. Instead of deferring to the agency,
74. Miller, 858 F.2d at 1456-57.
75. Weld County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Slovek, 723 P.2d 1309, 1316 (Colo. 1986).
76. Escamilla v. ASARCO, Inc., No. 91-CV-5716 (D. Colo. Apr. 26, 1993).
77. Id.
78. Magnolia Coal Terminal v. Phillips Oil Co., 576 So. 2d 475, 484 (La. 1991).
79. But see Briscoe v. Amoco, No. CIV-91-2072-L (W.D. Okla. June 7, 1993) (holding
that diminution in value was the proper measure of damages).
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the court usually finds that the plaintiff is entitled to prosecute his claims in
court without having to await any agency review.80 The result of the defend-
ant's best laid plan, then, is that he still has to defend himself in the court
action, but now he also has to defend himself in an agency action. While the
plaintiff typically seeks monetary damages, an agency typically seeks
cleanup. The defendant has effectively inflicted upon himself the ignominy
of a double recovery; and it has happened to defendants more than once in
Texas and Oklahoma. In short, the primary jurisdiction argument never
wins and often compounds the defendant's problem.81
3. Other Measures of Damages
In this kind of case, of course, there is always the specter of punitive dam-
ages, often the most significant component of any damage award.82 For ex-
ample, in the previously mentioned Marshall v. El Paso case, the jury
awarded $400,000 in actual damages but $5,000,000 in punitive damages.83
Although many states have enacted various tort reform measures, including
attempts to limit punitive damage awards, there are usually ways around the
caps, so defendants can take little comfort.84
In addition to the potential for punitive damages, however, other damage
theories in these cases have the potential to make the exposure for defend-
ants very high. As previously mentioned, the cost of remediation is making
progress as the preferred measure of actual damages over the traditional rule
of diminution in value.85 With remediation costs typically far in excess of
the value of the property, a defendant's exposure is virtually unlimited.
4. Miscellaneous Theories and Issues
Another theory, yet untested, involves seeking recovery of the value of the
loss of groundwater as a marketable commodity. In Texas, courts have pre-
viously considered a water well (and, by implication, the aquifer into which
the well has been drilled) to be part of the realty and, therefore, have not
recognized injury to an aquifer to be a separately compensable item of dam-
ages.86 Consequently, for the proposed theory to prevail, existing caselaw
would have to be overturned. As environmentalism grows and groundwater
as a resource increases in significance, however, it is possible that courts or
80. Marshall v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 874 F.2d 1373, 1377 (10th Cir. 1989); Magnolia
Coal Terminal, 576 So. 2d at 484.
81. See Town of Cyril v. Mobil, No. CIV-91-702-R (W.D. Okla. 1992) (granting defend-
ants' motion for summary judgment in the court case). But see Report of the Administrative
Law Judge-Okla. Corp. Comm'n, No. 21,825 (Aug. 12, 1992) (ordering defendants in the Cyril
case to conduct and pay for a study of the pollution on the subject property, which will likely
precede an order to remediate the polluted property).
82. Marshall, 874 F.2d at 1376.
83. Id.
84. In Marshall, the punitive damage award was imposed despite Oklahoma's recent en-
actment requiring a higher standard to support punitive damages. Id. at 1383-84.
85. Miller v. Cudahy, 858 F.2d 1449, 1453 (10th Cir. 1988).
86. See, e.g., Haynes B. Ownby Drilling Co. v. McClure, 264 S.W.2d 204, 207 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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legislatures could start considering aquifers separately and assigning them
their own value independent of the surface realty, much like the mineral
estate was separated from the surface and given a distinct value. For exam-
ple, in Oklahoma, a statute provides for recovery of treble damages for
wrongful injury to a tree.87 It is unclear whether recovery under this statute
would be in addition to, or in lieu of, other recoverable damages.
Finally, it is important to note that Oklahoma has a statute concerning
claims for property damage that provides for the recovery of attorney's fees
and costs by the prevailing party. 88 Technically, if a plaintiff recovers any
actual damages at all, the plaintiff is entitled to recover fees and costs in-
curred. Because these cases are so expensive to prosecute, the amount of
recoverable fees and costs could be quite substantial. This particular statute,
in fact, can significantly distort the analysis of exposure by a defendant, since
fees and costs would be recoverable by a plaintiff, regardless of how well a
defendant did at trial, short of a "zero" award.
III. CONCLUSION
Environmentalism has definitely come to the oilfield. In addition to re-
sponding to the statutory and regulatory barrage of the federal and state
governments, oil and gas companies must defend themselves against "new
and improved" applications of common law theories of recovery and meas-
ures of damages. Since government began enacting environmental legisla-
tion, most of the attention has been focused on regulatory compliance and
potential fines and penalties. Defendants should beware, however, of the
familiar weapons of the common law. At the end of the government rain-
bow is remediation of the polluted property, but at the end of the private
action rainbow is truly a pot of gold. Given the choice of remedies, it is not
difficult to discern which course will prove to be more popular with
plaintiffs.
87. OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 72 (1987).
88. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 940 (1988).
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